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discoverable by defense counsel and only through further in-
vestigation was the information eventually obtained. The
memorandum had been concealed by the Putnam County of-
ficials. The burden was on petitioner to prove it was this exter-
nal intervening act of concealment by the Putnam County of-
ficials that had "caused" petitioner's failure to raise this objec-
tion at trial, that it was not a tactical decision. The court of ap-
peals may not reverse district court's conclusion of the evidence
if it is plausible in the light of the record viewed in its entirety,
even though it may be convinced that had it been sitting as the
trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently."
Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985). There was
sufficient evidence in the record, considered in it's entirety, to
support the district court's findings. The court of appeals erred
by holding that petitioner's jury challenge was procedurally bar-
red from federal habeas review. The Supreme Court held that
the decision of the court of appeals be reversed and the case
remanded for proceedings consistent with the opinion.
APPLICATION TO VIRGINIA
The standard applied here in Amadeo makes it clear that the
petitioner must prove: 1) the information had been "reasonably
unknown" and 2) some "objective factor" external from the
petitioner "caused" the jury challenge not to be raised at trial.
State procedural rules will be upheld unless the attorney can
prove this information was not available at trial. All issues
available at trial must be raised and preserved for appeal.
It is critically important in a capital defense for the attorney
to check the composition of the jury array before the trial. If
there is a question about the legality of the jury master list and
the attorney fails to identify and preserve the issue for appeal,
it will probably be lost through procedural default. For addi-
tional information regarding the key issues in jury selection see
the article in this edition of the Digest, written by Professor
William Geimer, Capital Jury Selection in Virginia, at page 24.
(Elizabeth P. Murtagh)
SATTERWHITE v. TEXAS
486 U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 1792, 100 L.Ed.2d. 284 (1988)
FACTS
Petitioner was charged with the capital crime of murdering
Mary Francis Davis during a robbery, but before he was
represented by counsel, he was subjected to a court-ordered ex-
amination by a psychologist to determine his competency to
stand trial, sanity at the time of the offense, and future
dangerousness. Petitioner was not served with either a copy of
the State's motion for the examination or the court's order.
Petitioner was later indicted, counsel was appointed to represent
him and he was arraigned.
The District Attorney, without serving a copy of his motion
on defense counsel, requested a second psychiatric evaluation of
petitioner as to the same matters. Without determining whether
defense counsel had been notified of the State's motion, the
trial court granted the motion and ordered an examination by
the same psychologist and a specified psychiatrist.
After petitioner was tried by a jury and convicted of capital
murder, a separate sentencing procedure was conducted in ac-
cordance with Texas law before the same jury. Another
psychiatrist, Dr. Grigson, (whose letter had appeared in the
court file sometime during trial), appeared as a witness for the
State at the sentencing hearing and testified that, pursuant to
court order, he had examined petitioner and concluded that
petitioner was suffering from a severe antisocial personality
disorder, is extremely dangerous and will commit future acts of
violence. The petitioner was sentenced to death.
On petitioner's appeal of his death sentence, the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals held that the admission of Dr.
Grigson's testimony violated his Sixth Amendment right,
recognized in Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68
L.Ed.2d 359 (1981), (a defendant formally charged with a
capital crime has the right to consult with counsel before sub-
mitting to a psychiatric examination designed to determine
future dangerousness). However, the court concluded that the
constitutional violation was subject to harmless error analysis,
and that the error was harmless in this case. The U.S. Supreme
Court granted certiorari.
HOLDING
Whether harmless error analysis applies to violations of the
Sixth Amendment right set out in Estelle v. Smith.
The Court held that the harmless error rule applies to the
admission of psychiatric testimony in violation of the Sixth
Amendment right set out in Estelle v. Smith. The placement of
the State's motions and the court's ex parte orders for the
psychiatric testimony in the court file did not satisfy the re-
quirement of notice to the defense counsel that such psychiatric
evaluation of his client's future dangerousness would take place.
Consequently, the Court concluded that the use of Dr.
Grigson's testimony at the capital sentencing proceeding on the
issue of future dangerousness violated the Sixth Amendment.
The Court reasoned that although it has generally held that
if the prosecution can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a
constitutional error did not contribute to the verdict, the error
is harmless and the verdict may stand, "some constitutional
violations by their very nature cast so much doubt on the
fairness of the trial process that, as a matter of law, they can
never be considered harmless. Sixth Amendment violations that
pervade the entire proceeding fall within this category." 108
S.Ct. at 1797. The Court cited many cases including Holloway
v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426
(1978); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17
L.Ed.2d 705 17 C.Ed.2d 705 (1967); and White v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 59, 83 S.Ct. 1050, 10 L.Ed.2d 193 (1963) to support
this proposition.
In this case the Court stressed that the effect of the Sixth
Amendment violation is limited to the admission into evidence
of Dr. Grigson's testimony at the sentencing hearing. Conse-
quently, the error did not pervade the entire proceeding. Never-
theless, the erroneous admission of the psychiatric testimony
might have affected the capital sentencing jury and accordingly,
the court held that the Chapman harmless error rule applies to
the admission of psychiatric testimony in violation of the Sixth
Amendment right set out in Estelle v. Smith. The Court, citing
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824 (1967) stated
that the question to be addressed is whether the State has prov-
ed beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did
not contribute to the verdict obtained. Here the Court found
that Dr. Grigson's testimony "stands out both because of his
qualifications as a medical doctor specializing in psychiatry and
the powerful content of his message ... he told the jury that
Satterwhite was beyond the reach of psychiatric rehabilita-
tion."108 S.Ct. at 1799. Accordingly, the Court found the error
not to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and reversed the
judgment of the Texas court of Criminal Appeals insofar as it
affirmed Satterwhite's death sentence and remanded the case
for further proceedings.
APPLICATION TO VIRGINIA
In Virginia as in Texas, the finding of future dangerousness
can be critical to the imposition of the death sentence.
§19.2-264.2 of the Virginia Code enumerates the conditions for
the imposition of the death sentence in language very similar to
that cited by the court in Satterwhite at 1798. The Virginia code
states; "In assessing the penalty of any person convicted of an
offense for which the death penalty may be imposed, a sentence
of death shall not be imposed unless the court or jury
shall... find that there is a probability that the defendant
would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a
continuing serious threat to society. ." Va. Code Ann.,
§19.2-264.2 (1983).
The Commonwealth must comply with the Sixth Amend-
ment requirement set out in Estelle v. Smith, that defense
counsel be given advance notice of a psychiatric examination
encompassing the issue of future dangerousness. Under the
Court's application of the Chapman harmless error analysis,
failure to comply with the notice requirement, coupled with a
failure on the part of the State to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the
verdict obtained, may result in reversal. It is important to note,
that admission of psychiatric testimony in violation of this Sixth
Amendment right to notice will not result in automatic reversal
(as is the case in which the violation of a Sixth Amendment
right affects the entire criminal proceeding), but neither will it
easily be deemed harmless error. (Cecilia A. McGlew)
MAYNARD v. CARTWRIGHT
108 S.Ct. 1853 (1988)
FACTS
On May 4, 1982 Cartwright killed his employers Mr. and
Mrs. Hugh Riddle in their Oklahoma home. He shot and killed
Mr. Riddle, shot and stabbed Mrs. Riddle, and slit her throat.
The trial court found Cartwright guilty of first degree murder,
and sentenced him to death. The jury based the sentence, in
part, on the aggravating circumstances that the murder was
'especially heinous, atrocious or cruel." Okla. Stat, tit 21, §
701.12(4)(19 ). The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals af-
firmed on direct appeal, Cartwright v. State, 695 P.2d 548, cert
denied, 473 U.S. 911, 87 L.Ed.2d 661, 105 S.Ct. 3538 (1983),
and affirmed denial of state habeas corpus. Cartwright v. State,
708 P.2d 592 (1985), cert denied, 474 U.S. 1073, 88 L.Ed. 2d
808, 106 S.Ct. 837 (1986). The United States District Court
denied federal habeas corpus relief. A panel of the Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed, 802 F.2d 1203 (1986),
but after rehearing en bane granted relief on the limited claim
challenging as unconstitutionally vague the aggravating cir-
cumstance that the murder was "especially heinous, atrocious
or cruel."
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit sitting en bane
considered the vagueness challenge to the aggravating cir-
cumstance and ruled that the words "heinous," "atrocious"
and "cruel" were unconstitutionally vague under the Eighth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, because the
words did not direct the jury's discretion in deciding when the
death penalty is appropriate.
Petitioner Maynard sought review of the Tenth Circuit's
holding that the aggravating circumstance was unconstitutionally
vague in the Supreme Court of the United States.
HOLDING
The United States Supreme Court held unconstituionally
vague the statutory aggravating factor that the murder be
"heinous, atrocious or cruel." Title 21, §701.12(4). Maynard v.
Cartwright, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 1860 (1988):
Godfrey and Maynard compared
a) Godfrey v. Georgia as Controlling Precedent.
The United States Supreme Court saw its decision in God-
frey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980) as controlling in this case.
In Godfrey, the aggravating factor in the Georgia Statute re-
quired that the murder be "outrageously or wantonly vile,
horrible or inhumane in that it involved torture, depravity or an
aggravated battery to the victim." Ga. Code § 27-2534.1
